Thousands of Shiite fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan and from refugee communities living in Iran , paid by Tehran and operating under its direction, play an important role.
Such a presence gives Iran tremendous influence, and the Assad regime remains dependent on Iran to prosecute the war. Some Sunni leaders also include Yemen on this list.
Byman Yet it is also possible that Syria will resist, or at least try to put limits on, Iranian dominance. Iran has little in common ideologically with the Syrian regime, and the Arab-Persian divide also fosters some resentment. Pushing back against Iran would be a way for Syrian leaders to improve their once strong, but now devastated, nationalist credentials—a way of uniting Sunnis, Alawites, and others under a common banner. The desire to look beyond Tehran will be especially strong if Iran cannot provide substantial financial support while governments hostile to Iran are able to do so, enabling the regime to play off the rivals.
In neither case is it likely for Damascus to reject Tehran completely, but there is room for them to move along the spectrum. In part to counter Iran, many regional states are likely to steadily reengage Syria in the medium term. Egypt also floated the idea of a Syrian return to the Arab League. Even if the Syrian regime is able to regain control over areas currently controlled by Kurdish and Turkish forces and otherwise restore its sovereignty, it will remain desperately weak.
Politically, the regime—never popular—won due to the support of foreign powers and a brutal military campaign. VOA Newscasts Latest program. VOA Newscasts. Previous Next. Middle East. February 17, PM. VOA News. Get Adobe Flash Player. Embed share The code has been copied to your clipboard. The UAE unlocked the doors to its embassy in Damascus last year. It provided aid to the rebels but steered clear of providing arms.
Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has made overtures to lure Assad away from his strategic partnership with Iran. Arab countries have also found common cause with Assad in taking on the political Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood, a pan-Arab organization that organized much of the opposition against the regime and presents the most lethal threat to the continuation of many monarchies in the Gulf.
Sami Hamdi, a United Kingdom-based geopolitical risk consultant, said Assad is already frustrated at having his agency undermined by Moscow and even Tehran. More allies would give him room to play them against each other. The detente between Syria and its former Arab rivals may have been a long time in the works. It had baffled me then, as some of the Saudi-supported groups were still fighting the regime in areas near Damascus.
A year later, Lebanese sources close to the Syrian regime suggested to me that the Saudis had started intelligence cooperation with Assad. Khalid al-Humaidan, and his Syrian counterpart, Maj. Ali Mamlouk, indicated a rapprochement. Saudis and Emiratis had influence over former U.
President Donald Trump but have struggled to remain in the good graces of his successor Joe Biden. The ghastly humanitarian costs of the war keep rising, to include the largest refugee crisis in the world emanating from a region already suffering in a multitude of ways. The situation in Syria is a tragedy of epic proportions, which can make it difficult to take a sober view. Nevertheless, such a view must acknowledge three crucial dynamics looking forward:.
Granted, he rules a challenging, fragile, and fragmented Syria; one where violence will not cease in the coming years nor will efforts to unseat him. Partition is not a stable end state; it will be characterized by continued violence. Surely the regime in Damascus will seek to regain control over all of Syria, but doing so will be a difficult and costly effort. There exists a surfeit of worrisome implications of Assad staying in power.
Among them include the shattering of any lingering expectations for a different, more open, and democratic Syria. And, opponents of Iran and Hezbollah have warily realized that countering them cannot be a halfhearted affair. They are not pushovers and, as the continued bloodshed in Syria underscores, are willing to sacrifice mightily to protect their interests. The roles of Russia, Iran, and Turkey—and their increasing collaboration—stand out.
After spending much of the last decade modernizing its military, Russia has used Syrian territory as its tactical and operational testing ground while propping up the Assad regime.
Its efforts bought more than bases in the Middle East; they also bought Moscow a permanent seat at the table in any negotiations to end the war, and increased influence more broadly in the region. Iran, despite profound and persistent domestic political and economic vulnerabilities, has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to its mission in Syria, increasingly purchasing another strategic border with Israel.
Working by, with, and through Hezbollah, Iranian power projection across the Middle East has skyrocketed. Both Iran and Hezbollah are entrenched in Syria, which will make any U. Turkey, which has been turning away from the west for years, and with whom U. That frame is blurring as the fight against ISIS winds down and with it comes serious questions about the justification for future U.
While debating the circumstances under which two NATO allies may both invoke Article V is academic for some, the increasing salience of that debate is troubling.
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